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Abstract
Branded food manufacturers vindicate the use of excess production capacities to justify
their production of retailers’ brands. We study the distributor’s and food manufacturer’s
private label (PL) strategy for production within a framework featuring endogenous
store brand quality, bargaining power, possible differences in production technology
and potential capacity constraints for the branded manufacturer. Depending on the
structure of capacity constraint (applying to both products or to the PL only), we find
that the retailer may prefer to choose an independent firm for the production of the
store brand whereas the branded manufacturer is chosen in the case of excess capacity.
Keywords: production, brand competition, capacity constraint, retailing
JEL classification: L11, L13, Q13
1. Introduction
The increasing development of private labels (PLs), products managed and
sold by retailers, is unquestionably the most successful distributors’ strategy
of the last 30 years. In 2006 these products represented up to 25 per cent of
goods sold in the USA, 43 per cent in the United Kingdom, 30 per cent in
France and 16 per cent in Italy according to the Private Label Manufacturers’
Association (PLMA, 2009). Even though these figures conceal a strong
heterogeneity across product categories,1 PLs have become an inescapable
issue for retailers (store image, quality, advertising) as well as for manufac-
turers (production stake). Studies about PL producers’ characteristics are
rare and figures to make comparisons across countries do not exist. According
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1 In sub-sectors of the French agrofood industry such as milk, oil, desserts, ham, frozen food and
pasta, leading brand manufacturers do produce store brands. However, for some other pro-
ducts, exclusive national brand production is the rule (such as chocolate, water, soda etc.).
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to Moati et al. (2007), the number of agrofood firms that produce PL in France
has increased over time and represented 27 per cent of the total number of
firms in this sector in 2005. They generated 11.4 per cent of total French agro-
food industry revenue. The production of PL is mainly manufactured in small
and medium-sized French firms with a market share of 82 per cent in French
large food stores in 2006; 12 per cent for French National Brand (NB) manu-
facturers and the remaining 6 per cent corresponding to foreign agrofood
firms. However, the share of small and medium-sized firms in the production
of PL has tended to decrease to the benefit of large NB manufacturers.
The economic literature has mostly studied the impact of PLs on the ‘manu-
facturer–retailer’ vertical relationships with a focus on downstream
decisions (Berge`s-Sennou et al., 2004). One of the main conclusions is that
PLs have strengthened the retailer’s position vis-a`-vis manufacturers
because these store brands constitute a credible alternative to branded goods
and therefore enhance retailers’ reservation profits (Mills, 1998). Another
consequence of PL development concerns competition in the retail sector. In the
absence of PLs, retailers used to sell the same product range of NBs and they
were therefore competing on an intra brand basis for consumers’ patronage.
However, the appearance of PLs deeply modified this assortment. Characterised
by the fact that a store brand can only be purchased in a given store (or
chain store), consumers can no longer compare store brands with each other
on a price basis only. PLs therefore increase retailers’ differentiation in the
product range proposed and consequently lessen retailing competition. The
introduction of PLs can thus be seen as a twofold success (vertically and
horizontally) for retailers, to the detriment of the NB manufacturers.2
This analysis from the ‘downstream point-of-view’ (retailers) may not
only give the whole picture of what is really happening with PLs. PL pro-
duction is also an important issue for manufacturers (upstream). Large agro-
food firms in terms of manufacturers’ brand portfolio, like Kraft or
Unilever in the USA, confess that they produce PL for retailers. What
could encourage the NB manufacturer to agree to produce a competing
good? One answer is that if the manufacturer refuses, someone else will
do it and get this additional revenue. Another answer is that PL may be
a way for NB manufacturers to improve their contract conditions with retai-
lers for the NB products by also selling PL. As argued by NB manufac-
turers (Gomez-Arias and Bello-Acebron, 2008), a third possible
explanation may be that when they produce PLs, they use excess pro-
duction capacity that would be costly otherwise. PL production can thus
be a way for them to cover costs. However, if the manufacturer agrees
to produce the PL, there is a possibility that he will be capacity constrained
and thus will have to adapt his NB production.
2 For empirical studies about PL development and its impact on national brand prices (see
Bontemps et al., 2008, regarding France, or Ward et al., 2002, regarding the USA). A theoretical
model that supports empirical evidence on this particular topic is developed in Gabrielsen and
Sørgard (2007).
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There are two possibilities for a retailer when he decides on his store brand
production strategy. First, he can entrust his own brand to an independent firm
that only manufactures PLs. This solution is often chosen, as shown by the
statistics above and widely used when there is a new PL to launch, as men-
tioned in Hughes (1997). Secondly, the retailer can entrust the production
of his store brand to an NB manufacturer. This second solution is less
common and might be surprising. Producer choice for the production of
PL has been studied less widely in the literature. In a recent article,
Berge`s-Sennou (2006) finds that the distributor will entrust his store brand
production to the NB manufacturer when the retailer’s bargaining power
or the consumers’ store loyalty is high enough. However, the demand
specification used is quite restrictive and the characteristics of goods
(PL and NB) are exogenous, excluding the choice of the quality by both the
NB manufacturer and the retailer who may use this dimension as a strategic
rent-shifting device. Additionally, demand is completely inelastic, which
discards any capacity-constraint analysis.
In our article, in addition to the bargaining power versus efficiency trade-off
demonstrated in Berge`s-Sennou (2006), we consider not only the choice of PL
quality as a supplementary strategy for the retailer, but also the brand manu-
facturer counter-strategy by adapting his NB product characteristics. PL
quality endogeneity introduces a new non-price competition strategy for the
retailer on top of his product range decision. This results in a globally
elastic demand where the price of the PL not only affects the competition
between the branded product and the store brand, but also changes the total
quantity bought by consumers. Additionally, on a short-run basis, we incor-
porate into the framework production decisions linked to capacity constraints.
If the NB manufacturer produces the store brand, it clearly affects its pro-
duction decision on its NB by introducing a new opportunity cost of producing
the PL. Moreover, the PL quality may be adapted by the retailer in order to
enjoy maximal gain on the PL with the branded manufacturer by distorting
NB competitiveness.
The objective of our article is to investigate precisely both retailer’s and NB
manufacturer’s decisions for PL production. We find that the retailer will not
always entrust the production of his PL to the NB manufacturer. When nego-
tiating with the NB manufacturer, the outcome will depend on the relative
production cost-advantage of the manufacturer compared with the competitive
fringe as well as on the quality of the NB brand. He will select the NB manu-
facturer only if the NB quality is not too high compared with the quality of its
own brand and when the cost-advantage is high enough. Moreover, when the
NB manufacturer cannot choose freely his production because he is capacity
constrained on the total production (NB and PL), results show that the retailer
may not entrust the PL to the brand manufacturer (even if the PL quality
would be higher). When capacity constraint only applies to PL, the retailer
may jeopardise his decision if the cost disadvantage of the competitive
fringe is not too high. The conclusion of our article is thus that NB manufac-
turers may produce PLs when they are not capacity constrained or if the excess
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production facilities are only devoted to store brands. Otherwise, the neces-
sary readjustment of the NB strategy makes the retailer reluctant to entrust
the PL to the NB producer.
The article is organised as follows. The next section presents the economic
framework and firms’ strategies. Section 2 analyses the retailer’s choice of
product range and PL quality as well as the PL production decision. Section
3 introduces the possibility for the NB manufacturer to be capacity con-
strained, distinguishing whether the constraint applies to total production
(NB and PL) or to PL quantities only. The impact on quality and welfare
are then analysed. Finally, a general discussion with conclusions follows.
2. The framework and timing of the game
A downstream monopolist retailer R can sell two goods, differentiated in
quality. One product is a branded good (NB) of exogenous quality qNB
produced by an upstream manufacturer M at a unit cost cM(qNB) = q2NB/2.
The second additional product is a store brand (PL) of endogenous quality
qPL. Quality is mainly the result of the combination of product characteristics
such as ingredients and recipes, thus affecting marginal cost. It is assumed that
the quality of the PL is lower than that of the NB: qPL, qNB.
3 There may be
many explanations but the most relevant one is that NB products are heavily
advertised by branded manufacturers, whereas store brands are not. This
generates a higher willingness-to-pay for NBs than for PLs (see Bell et al., 2000;
Berge`s et al., 2009).
To produce the PL, the retailer has two options: either he asks an inde-
pendent firm from a competitive fringe (I) or he turns to the NB manufacturer
(M) and tries to draw up a production contract for his own good. We suppose
that the retailer negotiates tariff conditions in a Nash axiomatic framework
with the NB manufacturer. The bargaining power of the latter will be
denoted a and the retailer’s will thus be (12 a). It is important to note that
these alternatives for PL production do not have the same implications for
both parties. In the first case, since the upstream independent manufacturer
is assumed to be part of a competitive sector, he will thus make no margin
(classic Bertrand competition) and all profits made on the PL are captured
by the retailer. However, like in Bontems et al. (1999), we assume that for
the same PL quality to be produced, the independent firm incurs a unit-cost
disadvantage relative to the branded manufacturer: cM(qPL)= q2PL/2,
whereas cI(qPL) = cq2PL/2 and c ≥ 1. This can be because of a technology
3 Empirical analysis (Dodds et al., 1991) shows that brand names have a positive effect on percep-
tion of quality and willingness to pay. This article focuses on low-priced PLs that are designed for
consumers with low willingness to pay or that mimic NB products but often sell at a lower price.
It does not apply to high-quality PLs that have been recently introduced in order to increase con-
sumer loyalty or to attract new consumers. However, for such items, concerning their pro-
duction, retailers exclusively turn towards small specialized firms, discarding national brand
manufacturers. The issue for high-quality PL production cannot be treated within our framework
since the trade-off exposed in our article would never occur.
Page 4 of 27 F. Berges and Z. Bouamra-Mechemache
 by guest on M
arch 24, 2011
e
ra
e
.o
xfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
difference coming from an experienced manufacturer (the NB one) or because
of the difference in services the NB manufacturer may handle compared with
the independent manufacturer when producing a PL. More arguments are
given in Comanor and Rey (2000) or Galizzi et al. (1997).
The retailer faces a demand constituted by a continuum of consumers
whose utility is given by Mussa and Rosen (1978): U(u, q, p) ¼ uq 2 p,
where u is the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for quality and q is the
quality of the product bought at price p. The parameter u is uniformly distrib-
uted across [0,1].4 The timing of the game is as follows:
Step 1: The retailer chooses his product range. He can either sell an NB,
a PL or both products. If the retailer chooses to introduce his own PL, he
simultaneously selects the product quality (qPL) and who will produce it:
the NB manufacturer or an independent firm. The retailer negotiates a
wholesale price wPL and a franchise fee F with the selected firm. If the
retailer also decided to sell the NB, then he also negotiates the wholesale
price of the NB product wNB with the branded manufacturer. In this
situation, one franchise fee F is negotiated to share the total gain from
the sales of PL and NB.
Another option could be to have PL quality negotiated in a preceding step of
the game as quality seems to be more irreversible than wholesale prices and
franchises. However, the article focuses on the choice of the PL manufacturer.
This choice impacts on the technology used and may thus result in a different
PL quality. To evacuate a complicated scheme where PL quality could be
changed according to the choice of PL manufacturer, which in turn results
in a change in wholesale prices and franchises, the model considers that the
retailer decides (and proposes) it all at once.5
Step 2: The retailer decides the final prices of the PL (pPL) and/or the NB
good (pNB).
The game proposed here takes into account the fact that the two brands stra-
tegically interact in the negotiation through one franchise for both products.
This assumption reinforces the bargaining position of the NB manufacturer
and allows him to have better product positioning for his branded product
(Galizzi et al., 1997). Bundling the NB and the PL when they are produced
by the same manufacturer allows us to take into account the risk for the retailer
4 PL quality endogeneity creates an asymmetry between the retailer (who controls its product
quality) and the manufacturer (who does not). Product differentiation is therefore de facto
decided by the retailer. Empirically, NB quality does not vary across retailers (indeed, the NB
manufacturer cannot adapt quality for each retailer) whereas PL quality does since it is retailer
specific. Therefore, in our framework where we consider the equilibrium for a given retailer’s
chain, we assume NB quality as given for the retailer. This assumption will however be relaxed
in Section 4.
5 A precise analysis of the retailer’s commitment on his store brand quality and its impact on
vertical surplus sharing can be found in Caprice (2000). Moreover, a UK report from the
Competition Commission (2000) on groceries supply emphasizes how difficult it is for a retailer
to change PL supplier once the product has been defined.
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of making his profits dependent fully on one manufacturer (i.e. zero profit if
the negotiation over the NB tariff fails). Moreover, sacrificing his
outside-option can be seen as the opportunity cost for the retailer to enjoy
NB manufacturer cost advantage.6 If this assumption is removed, the only
possible outcome is that the NB manufacturer produces the PL, which does
not corroborate observed facts. Two explanations can be put forward to
explain this. The NB manufacturer may indeed condition the delivery of the
PL on the negotiation outcome over the NB and this is taken into account
in our model. In addition, it is not easy for a retailer to change suppliers
quickly without affecting the characteristics of the PL. On the contrary,
when the PL product is produced by a different firm, the retailer has a positive
disagreement pay off (reservation profit) because the PL supply is independent
of the NB negotiation issue. Berge`s-Sennou (2006: 322) as well as Caprice
(2000) provide more economic arguments on this issue.
3. Benchmark case: no capacity constraint
We can summarise the choice of the retailer as follows: which good(s) to
propose in his store (NB and/or PL) and who should produce the PL if the
need arises. The quality of the PL is also a strategic choice for the retailer,
and the store brand manufacturer’s identity (related to cost) will thus be of
importance. We solve the game with backward induction.
3.1. Selling only the NB
If the retailer decides to introduce only an NB of quality qNB at a price pNB,
consumers buy the good as long as uqNB − pNB . 0 ⇔ u . pNB/qNB. The
market is not covered and the consumers’ demand for the NB good is given
by:
DNB( pNB) = 1 − pNB
qNB
.
Since we assume a Nash framework for tariff negotiations, the manufacturer
and the retailer jointly maximise the vertical profits by setting the wholesale
price to the marginal cost while the fixed part F, paid by the retailer to
the manufacturer, will leave the manufacturer a share of the vertical profit
proportional to his bargaining power (no reserve profit here).7 The program
of the retailer is thus:
max
pNB
pRNB = ( pNB − w∗NB) 1 −
pNB
qNB
( )
− F (1)
6 This issue was raised thanks to an anonymous referee.
7 The detailed analytical framework and its foundations are described in Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990).
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where
w∗NB = cM(qNB) =
q2NB
2
.
Solving (1) gives the subgame equilibrium price of the NB and the
corresponding profits for the retailer (pR
∗
NB) and the NB manufacturer (p
M∗
NB):
p∗NB =
1
4
qNB(2 − qNB);
pR
∗
NB =
1 − a
16
((2 − qNB)2qNB);
and
pM
∗
NB =
a
16
((2 − qNB)2qNB) = F∗ .
3.2. Selling only the PL
The retailer may only sell his own product of quality qPL at price pPL to con-
sumers rather than selling a NB. In such a case, the demand for the store brand
product is defined by:
DPL( pPL, qPL) = 1 − pPL
qPL
.
If the retailer entrusts the PL production of quality qPL to an independent firm
(equilibrium denoted eq. cf1 hereafter), the wholesale price is set to the unit
cost of production and the franchise fee to zero because of the competitive
pressure in the industry. The retailer captures all the gain from the sales of
the PL. The program of the distributor is therefore:
max
p
cf1
PL
pR(cf 1) = ( pcf1PL − wcf1
∗
PL ) 1 −
p
cf 1
PL
q
cf1
PL
( )
− Fcf1 (2)
where
w
cf1∗
PL =
c(qcf1PL )2
2
.
The outcome of this maximisation is p
cf1∗
PL = (1/4)qcf1PL (2 + cqcf1PL ), which leads
to pR cf1( )∗ (qcf1PL ) = [(2 − cqcf1PL )2qcf1PL /16]. Maximising pR cf1( )
∗(qcf1PL ) with
respect to q
cf1
PL gives the optimal PL quality, q
cf 1∗
PL = 2/3c and an ex-post
retailer profit equal to pR cf1( )∗ = 2/27c.
A second option for the retailer is to entrust PL production to the branded
manufacturer (option denoted eq. nb1 hereafter). The wholesale price is still
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set to unit cost, but the franchise fee will then reflect the manufacturer’s pos-
ition within the vertical structure. In other words, the retailer maximises:
max
pnb1
PL
pR(nb1) = pnb1PL − wnb1
∗
PL
( )
1 − p
nb1
PL
qnb1PL
( )
− Fnb1 (3)
where wnb1
∗
PL = (qnb1PL )2/2.
The optimal price pnb1
∗
PL for the PL if the retailer contracts with the NB
manufacturer is derived from Equation (3): pnb1
∗
PL = (1/4)qnb1PL (2+qnb1PL ).
Replacing pnb1PL by this expression in the corresponding profit functions
gives the optimal profit for the retailer and the NB manufacturer:
pR(nb1)(qnb1PL ) =
(1 − a)(2 − qnb1PL )2qnb1PL
16
and
pM(nb1)∗ = a(2 − q
nb1
PL )2qnb1PL
16
= Fnb1∗ .
The retailer and the NB manufacturer share the total gains from the sales of the
PL. We assume that the retailer has no outside option at this stage of the game.
This assumption relies on the commitment the retailer faces concerning the
choice of the producer for his PL. In other words, it is assumed that the
threat of turning to the competitive fringe when the retailer has already
opted for the NB manufacturer is not credible.8 Maximising the ex-post
profit according to the PL quality leads to optimal quality for the PL when
it is produced by the NB manufacturer:
qnb1
∗
PL =
2
3
and pR(nb1)
∗ = 2(1 − a)
27
.
Comparing the subgame equilibrium profits for the retailer when he turns to an
independent firm or to the NB manufacturer for the production of his PL
shows the crucial role played by the trade-off for the retailer. When he
decides on his strategy about who should produce his PL, he balances the
gain he can get from the efficient technology proposed by the NB manufac-
turer (translated by a cost advantage) with his weaker position in the nego-
tiation. This comes from the fact that the manufacturer’s bargaining power
also applies to PL tariff conditions. As a consequence, he makes a trade-off
between higher quality for his PL at lower cost and rents to leave to the
upstream manufacturer. Actually, the NB manufacturer is able to offer a
8 As discussed in Comanor and Rey (2000), if the independent firm is a potential entrant or a less
established firm, the retailer may face coordination and communication problems (less infor-
mation available on capacities and characteristics of the firms) that might generate additional
transaction costs. Assuming no outside option at this stage of the game can then be justified
by the existence of excessively high transaction costs in the short run so that the retailer’s threat
at this stage is marginal.
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wide range of product characteristics such that q
cf1∗
PL , qPL , qNB. In other
words, the NB manufacturer may always do better than an independent firm
because of its technological advantage, but the PL product remains of lower
quality than its branded product.
3.3. Selling both NB and PL
We now turn to the case where the retailer decided to sell both competing pro-
ducts of unequal quality: NB and PL. For a NB of quality qNB sold at a price
pNB and a PL of quality qPL, qNB sold at a price pPL, demand is as follows:
DNB( pNB, pPL, qPL) = 1 − pNB − pPL
qNB−qPL
while
DPL( pNB, pPL, qPL) = pNB−pPL
qNB−qPL
− pPL
qPL
.
The first possibility, like in the previous case, is to entrust the PL to an
independent firm (eq. cf2). If an agreement is found, then w
cf2
NB = q2NB/2.
Regarding the PL, since the production comes from the competitive sector,
it is also set to marginal cost: w
cf2∗
NB = c(qcf2PL )2/2. Therefore, the retailer’s
program is to maximise:
max
{pcf2
NB
,p
cf2
PL
,q
cf2
PL
}
pR(cf2) = pcf2NB −
q2NB
2
( )
1− p
cf2
NB − pcf 2PL
qNB − qcf 2PL
( )
+ pcf2PL −
c · (qcf2PL )2
2
( )
p
cf2
NB − pcf2PL
qNB − qcf2PL
− p
cf2
PL
q
cf2
PL
( )
− Fcf2
(4)
When the PL production is entrusted to an independent firm, the equilibrium
quality of the PL and the equilibrium prices of the NB and PL can thus be
derived:
p
cf2∗
NB =
1
4
qNB(2 + qNB); qcf2
∗
PL =
1
4
qNB 3 −
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
9c− 8√ NameMeNameMe
c
√
( )
p
cf 2∗
PL =
qNB
NameMeNameMe
c
√ (12 + (9c− 4)qNB) −
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe(9c− 8)√ (3cqNB + 4)[ ]
32
NameMeNameMe
c
√
leading to the following vertical profit to be shared between the retailer and the
manufacturer:
Pcf2∗ =
qNB 32 + qNB(
NameMeNameMe
c
√ (9c− 8)32qNB − 32 − 9c(3c− 4)qNB
( )
128
Since the negotiation takes place in a Nash bargaining framework and the
retailer contracts in this case with the independent firm, the outside option
of the retailer is positive, if no agreement is reached with the NB
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manufacturer. If the retailer refuses an agreement on the NB with the branded
manufacturer, he still can sell his PL and put one product (instead of two) on
the shelves. In such a case, he cannot change quality since the quality choice
was made at stage 1 (commitment on the definition of product characteristics).
However, he can change the PL price to take into account the fact that he
becomes a single-product monopolist. In case of disagreement, the retailer’s
reservation profit is therefore given by:
max
pPL
p˜R = pPL − c · (q
cf2∗
PL )2
2
( )
1 − pPL
q
cf2∗
PL
( )
; (5)
leading to
p˜PL =
1
4
q
cf2∗
PL (2 + cqcf 2
∗
PL )
and
p˜R
∗ = (3 NameMeNameMec√ − NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe9c− 8√ )qNB(8 − 3cqNB + NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMec(9c− 8)√ qNB)2
1024c
The retailer’s profit from the sales of the NB when he also sells a PL that is
produced by the competitive fringe will then depend on his relative bargaining
power with respect to the NB manufacturer as well as his outside option:
pR(cf2)
∗= (1 − a)(Pcf2∗−p˜R∗ ) + p˜R∗ . The retailer will pay the NB manufac-
turer a franchise fee Fcf2
∗= a(Pcf2∗ − p˜R∗ ) that will also depend on his
relative bargaining power and on the disagreement payoff of the retailer.
The second possibility is to entrust the PL production to the NB manu-
facturer (eq. nb2). In this case, the retailer profits depend on the NB and PL
production from the same manufacturer. To model this particular choice,
we follow Berge`s-Sennou (2006) and assume that the franchise negotiated
with the NB manufacturer concerns both the PL and the NB. Such a con-
tractual restriction is in fact a shortcut that structurally modifies the game
by depriving the retailer of using the PL as an outside option when nego-
tiating the branded product. The resulting loss in retailer’s bargaining
power thus translates into a negotiation advantage for the branded manufac-
turer. Therefore, one consequence will be that profits coming from the PL
have to be part of the negotiation, and thus shared according to each
agent’s bargaining power. Additionally, in case of a disagreement in the
negotiation process over the NB tariffs, the retailer no longer has a reser-
vation profit since both goods are negotiated jointly. One could think
about the possibility for the retailer of changing PL producer, but we
rule this out, arguing that establishing a new partnership takes time as
well as defining new product characteristics.
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The efficient Nash bargaining framework leads to the wholesale price set to
marginal cost and the retailer’s objective is to maximise:
max
{pnb2
NB
,pnb2
PL
,qnb2
PL
}
pR(nb2) = pnb2NB −
q2NB
2
( )
1 − p
nb2
NB − pnb2PL
qNB − qnb2PL
( )
+ pnb2PL −
(qnb2PL )2
2
( )
pnb2NB − pnb2PL
qNB − qnb2PL
− p
nb2
PL
qnb2PL
( )
− Fnb2
(6)
This results in
pnb2
∗
NB =
1
4
qNB(2 + qNB);
qnb2
∗
PL =
qNB
2
;
pnb2PL =
1
16
qNB(4 − qNB);
and
pR(nb2)∗ = (1 − a)(qNB(5qNB − 16) + 16)qNB
64
for qNB , (4/3). This condition ensures that Dnb2∗NB ( pnb2
∗
NB , p
nb2∗
PL , q
nb2∗
PL ) . 0.
3.4. Benchmark: the retailer’s product range choice
All the subgames being solved, we need to compare the retailer’s profit to
know which choice is best between introducing one product or not and
having the PL produced by the NB manufacturer or the independent firm if
the need arises. Figure 1 depicts the case when a = 1/4.
Proposition 1. For excessively low or high values of the NB quality, the
retailer only sells his PL, whereas for intermediate values, it is in the retailer’s
interest to sell the NB product in addition to his own PL. Moreover, if the PL
production cost-advantage of the branded manufacturer is high enough, the
retailer entrusts its store good production to the latter.
When the quality of the NB is relatively low, the retailer does not have any
incentive to sell it since the PL is more competitive compared with the
branded product: he therefore chooses to sell exclusively the PL good. This
outcome prevails in situations (eq. cf1) and (eq. nb1) at the bottom of
Figure 1. The choice for the PL producer is still relevant. For low levels of
unit cost (c) incurred by the independent firm, the retailer entrusts his PL pro-
duction to one firm from the competitive fringe (eq. cf1). Indeed, the revenue
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of the PL then goes entirely to the retailer. However, if this cost increases, it
becomes profitable for the distributor to have his PL produced by the NB
manufacturer (eq. nb1). An independent firm in this case turns out to be too
inefficient compared with the rents the retailer has to leave to the NB manu-
facturer (bargaining process). Note that, for a given NB quality qNB, it
becomes profitable for the retailer to also sell the branded product when
cost c increases. This is the consequence of discrimination gains that tend
to decrease the PL quality and thus to enlarge the PL–NB quality gap.
When the quality of the NB is higher, the retailer sells both products (areas
cf2 and nb2). The trade-off for the PL manufacturing between (eq. cf2) and
(eq. nb2) depends on the cost disadvantage of the independent firm as well
as the gain he can get from the NB negotiation outcome (resulting from the
retailer’s bargaining power when a , a˜ = (43 − NameMeNameMeNameMe57√ )/64. PL production
is entrusted to the NB manufacturer (eq. nb2) when the cost disadvantage
of the independent firm is too high and jeopardises PL profitability. Moreover,
the NB is produced only if there is a positive demand (NB price needs to be
lower than consumers’ willingness to pay), which is the case when
qNB , 4/3 translating into an upper limit for area (nb2).
Finally, for high values of NB quality, consumers no longer buy the branded
product (price too high) but they still buy the PL product (as depicted by areas
cf1 and nb1 at the top of the figure). The trade-off for its production fully
depends on the unit cost c as in the first situation when qNB was low.
When the bargaining power of the NB manufacturer increases, the retailer
will be less inclined to entrust its PL to the branded manufacturer. For a given
Fig. 1. Equilibrium for retailer’s products when a = 1/4.
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NB quality, the trade-off between bargaining power and efficiency is depicted
in Figure 2.
When a is small, the retailer chooses the NB manufacturer to produce its PL
even if the NB manufacturer does not have a large comparative cost advan-
tage. For intermediate values of a, the retailer cannot capture enough rent
from the negotiation with the NB and always prefers his PL to be produced
by an independent firm. Finally, if the bargaining power of the NB manufac-
turer becomes too large, the retailer modifies his product range by delisting
the NB.9 It turns out that the situation where the NB manufacturer does
produce both goods is less likely than the one where the PL is entrusted to
an independent firm. This outcome seems to fit with stylised facts where
only 12 per cent of PL goods are produced by French branded manufacturers.
Actually, as in Berge`s-Sennou (2006), the bargaining power of the manu-
facturer reflects his ability to extract rents from the negotiation with the
retailer. It does not affect the joint profit made from the sale of both products
on the market but the share of the profit each agent will capture. Then, when
the retailer decides on PL production, he has to take into account its ability to
retain a limited share of the vertical surplus. If such ability is low, retailer’s
own profit will be low despite the higher total profit generated when the
branded manufacturer produces the PL. However, the share of the joint
profit the distributor will capture increases with his bargaining power. So, if
he earns enough, he will then entrust the production of the PL to the NB manu-
facturer. This bargaining power argument could partially explain why only
few large firms produce PL while smaller firms are more inclined to do so.
Fig. 2. Equilibrium for retailer’s products when qNB ¼ 1.
9 Note that since the exogenous level of the NB is set to 1 in Figure 2, equilibrium nb1 vanishes as a
high bargaining power of the NB manufacturer results in low rents for the retailer on its PL
product.
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One interesting outcome relies on the PL quality level with respect to the
introduction of the NB product. For instance, when qNB = 3/2, PL quality
is higher under eq. cf1 and eq. nb1 (without NB sold) than under eq. cf2.
This emphasises the role of the PL as a discriminating product to serve low
willingness-to-pay consumers when the NB is also distributed.
Such a benchmark situation throws light on the retailer’s decision determi-
nants concerning his production choices (labels to be produced, identity of the
producers). It also explains the NB manufacturer strategy related to the pro-
duction of the PL. When his production capacity is not limited, he never
refuses to produce the PL because he always finds it more profitable to
accept (getting higher profits on an additional good) rather than leaving the
production to an independent firm and only suffering competition on his
branded good (even if quality of PL is lower).
This result confirms the idea that NB manufacturers do produce PL when
they have excess capacity. However, they may also find such a strategy to
be profitable when they have limited capacities. In this case, the argument
of costly unused capacity as a justification of PL production will not be
fully verified.
In the next section, we consider the case where the manufacturer is capacity
constrained.10 He may therefore have to choose his production scheme if
asked by the retailer to produce the PL.
4. The NB manufacturer is capacity constrained
Capacity constraint arises for the manufacturer when the total quantity he
should produce exceeds the maximal quantity he can produce (denoted
K).11 If the production process makes it possible to substitute one production
line assigned to the NB to another assigned to the PL with negligible cost, then
the constraint should apply to total production. We assume that the qualities of
PL and NB are subjectively considered as different by consumers because of
marketing strategies (qNB. qPL), even if the products’ characteristics may be
objectively similar. In such a case, a capacity constraint applying to total pro-
duction means that it is easy for the manufacturer to reallocate the production
process between the NB and the PL if needed. On the contrary, when
10 While the long-run analysis is given by Section 1, capacity constraint may be considered even
when contracts are efficient in the short-run. The manufacturer may indeed fail to choose the
right capacity for the long-run equilibrium because, for instance, the evolution of demand
may not have been correctly anticipated.
11 Capacity constraint is formalised in the usual extreme way where the production marginal cost
becomes infinite once total quantity produced has reached the limit capacity K. Also, there could
be a fixed cost to be paid by the firm based on the production capacity limit: f(K) where (·) is an
increasing function of the upper production limit of the manufacturer. However, this would not
alter the manufacturer trade-off in the sense that such a fixedcost wouldhave tobe paid irrespective
of the choice to produce the PL or not. Indeed, by definition, such a cost would be linked to capacity
constraint, whether this capacity is used or not. The only implicit assumption we make is to assume
that the minimalprofit the manufacturer receives covers the capacityconstraint fixed cost. Since we
are more interested in the manufacturer’s strategy in producing or not the PL, such a formalization
of the capacity cost did not appear to be relevant in our analysis.
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switching is not possible, then capacity constraint should apply only to the PL
production quantities. This implies that the manufacturer has an excess pro-
duction capacity that he chooses to devote exclusively and irreversibly to
PL production.
There may be some potential ambiguity between the assumptions of pro-
duction process substitutability and final goods substitutability.12 However,
there is no clear relationship between the two. It is not because a manufacturer
can switch easily between two production processes that the goods produced
are necessarily close substitutes in the end. Indeed, one production process
with a specific number of input processing steps may lead to different final
goods that are not close substitutes. Input combinations can be changed
without using a different production process (for instance, for the same pro-
duction line, changing cacao and/or milk content may result in very differen-
tiated chocolate products).
The next section analyses the case where K applies to total production,
while Section 4.2 tackles the issue when capacity constraint only applies to
PL quantities.
4.1. Capacity constraint applies to both NB and PL production
The assumption that capacity constraint applies to total production is charac-
terised by:
Dnb2
∗
NB + Dnb2
∗
PL =
1
8
(4 − 3qNB) + 1
4
qNB ≥ K ⇔ qNB ≤ 4 − 8K , 4
3
(7)
The above inequality boils down to k . 1/3. For the total demand to be con-
strained, the NB quality has to be low enough. The substitution pattern
between products results in an increased PL demand when the NB quality
decreases. Due to Mussa and Rosen specifications, total demand increases
and becomes constrained since there are more consumers buying the PL
good. Moreover, for a potential manufacturer’s trade-off to arise in (eq.
nb2), the bargaining power a must satisfy:
a , a˜K = (969 + 613
NameMeNameMeNameMe
57
√ )(1 − 2K)2
4(K(802 NameMeNameMeNameMe57√ K − 741 NameMeNameMeNameMe57√ + 171) + 185 NameMeNameMeNameMe57√ + 19) , a˜.
Indeed, if the manufacturer has a high bargaining power, the retailer may not
be likely to entrust his PL to him and, therefore, the case where the manu-
facturer is capacity constrained may not show up.13
The retailer’s program when PL is produced by the NB manufacturer and
wholesale prices are set to marginal cost is (superscript K will denote variables
12 We thank one anonymous referee for pointing out this issue on product characteristics.
13 This condition is the solution of the limit NB quality (qNB) defined by pR(cf 2)(qNB) = pR(nb2)(qNB)
when c¼ 3 and then qNB , 4 − 8K .
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in this setting):
max
( pK
NB
,pK
PL
,qK
PL
)
PK = pKNB −
q2NB
2
( )
1 − p
K
NB − pKPL
qNB − qKPL
( )
+ pKPL −
(qKPL)2
2
( )
× K − 1 + p
K
NB − pKPL
qNB − qKPL
( )
− FK .
This implicitly assumes an ‘efficient rationing rule’ for consumers between PL
and NB, as described in Tirole (1988: 213). Once NB consumers are served,
PL quantity will clear the market according to the remaining production
capacity. Indeed, since the quality of the NB is higher than that of the PL
and costs are quadratic, the net value of the NB is greater than that provided
by the PL from a vertical industry point-of-view. The maximising profit price
for the PL is:
pK
∗
PL( pKNB, qKPL) =
4pKNB − (qNB − qKPL)(2 − 2K + qNB + qKPL)
4
.
This generates a quantity demanded for each product equal to:
DK
∗
NB(pKNB, qKPL) =
1
4
2(1 + K) − qNB − qKPL
( )
and
DK
∗
PL(pKNB, qKPL) =
−4pKNB + qNB(2 − 2K + qNB + qKPL)
4qKPL
The capacity constraint is binding when DK
∗
NB( pKNB, qKPL) + DK
∗
PL( pKNB, qKPL) = K
which translates into the following NB equilibrium price:
pK
∗
NB(qKPL) =
(2(1 − K) + qNB − qKPL)(qNB + qKPL)
4
.
Incorporating these final prices and maximising the resulting retailer’s profit
leads to the optimal PL quality:
qK∗PL (K) =
1
3
4 − 8K − qNB + 2
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
7K2 + 4K(qNB − 1) + (qNB − 1)2
√( )
The ex-post profit for the industry at the equilibrium is thus:
PK∗ = 1
54
[
2 − 12K + 6K2 + 20K3
−2 7K2 + 4K qNB − 1
( )+ qNB − 1( )2( )32
−6qNB − 30KqNB + 48K2qNB + 6q2NB + 15Kq2NB − 2q3NB
]
(8)
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The retailer gets pR(K
∗) = (1 − a)PK∗ while the NB manufacturer receives
pM(K
∗) = (1 − a)PK∗ .
Proposition 2. When the branded manufacturer is capacity constrained on
both goods, the retailer prefers to turn to an independent firm for PL
production.
One consequence when the manufacturer is capacity constrained on total
production is that the quantities of its own NB product have to be adjusted.
The optimal quality of the PL product is indeed higher than in the un-
constrained framework in order to enjoy market restriction; this generates a
higher PL final price and thus more NB product sold than in the benchmark
case. In the above discussion, we implicitly assume that the contract signed
between the manufacturer and the retailer does not modify quantities provided
by the NB manufacturer to rival distributors. Taking into account downstream
competition may indeed modify the quantities ordered by competing retailers
and therefore total quantities produced by the branded manufacturer. This
would have an impact on the capacity constraint fulfilment when it applies
to both products: for instance, the NB price increase due to PL production
reorganisation may lead to an increase in demand from rival retailers,
thereby making the capacity constraint K more stringent. Situations where
the PL is produced by the branded manufacturer would thus become less
likely when competition increases.
Berge`s-Sennou (2006) emphasised the importance of the trade-off between
efficiency and bargaining power in the retailer’s choice of PL manufacturer. In
the framework developed here, PL quality is endogenised and the price of
goods does influence the quantities sold. The PL quality decision by the retailer
constitutes an additional strategy to its introduction in order to exploit
market power on this product. This strategic effect is reinforced in the pres-
ence of a production capacity constraint. In this case, the retailer would
choose to ask the NB manufacturer for a higher PL quality resulting in
more intense competition with the NB. Indeed, this leads to lower revenue
from the NB product and makes the choice of an independent firm (eq. cf2)
more attractive for PL production. Moreover, the benefits of efficiency
linked to lower production cost in equilibrium (nb2K) are always overridden
by the gains of bargaining power (since all benefits of the PL are taken by the
retailer when negotiating with an independent firm). Therefore, when the NB
manufacturer is capacity constrained on total production, the retailer always
turns to an independent firm for its store brand production, whatever the
cost disadvantage.
Simulations made for a = 1/4 and K = 0.37 (since 4 − 8K . 0.8 and
4 − 8K , 4/3) lead to equilibrium depicted in Figure 3 (with
qNB [ [(3/4, 4/3]). The capacity constraint condition is relevant when
qNB ≤ 4 − 8K, translating into qNB ≤ 1.04. Then, when the capacity con-
straint is binding, the NB manufacturer no longer produces the PL for the
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retailer while he was doing so without constraint (dashed area). His revenue
from the PL production vanishes when the retailer turns to the independent
firm, leading to a reduction in the NB manufacturer’s profit.
When there is a capacity constraint for the NB manufacturer that applies
to both products, the retailer prefers to entrust his store brand good to an
independent firm. Potential efficiency gains on the PL if produced by the
manufacturer are offset by the loss incurred on the NB product because of
its price decrease and by the gain in bargaining revenue the retailer captures
when negotiating with the independent firm.
4.2. Capacity constraint only applies to the PL production
Contrary to the previous section, we could assume that the production process
is such that the manufacturer may find it costly to assign a production line
from one good to another. This could result from specific tasks (or steps) in
the production line that are connected intrinsically with the nature of the
NB product. Therefore, the manufacturer decision will relate to producing
PL with specific extra capacity that is not used to the detriment of the NB
product.
The situation where capacity constraint (k) applies to PL production only is
thus characterised by (superscript k will denote such setting):
Dnb2PL =
1
4
qNB ≥ k ⇔ 4k ≤ qNB ≤ 4
3
implying k ≤ 1
3
. (9)
Note that when capacity constraint applied to total production instead of PL
production only, the characterisation was reversed: the NB product needed
Fig. 3. Equilibrium for retailer’s products when a = 1/4 and capacity constraint on
NB + PL.
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to be of low enough quality. When the capacity constraint applies only to PL
production, an increase in NB quality directly implies an increase in PL
quality and thus generates a higher PL demand which is now potentially
constrained.
The limit price the retailer may set in order to sell no more than the total PL
quantity is given by:
Dk
∗
PL(p˜PL) ≤ k ⇔ p˜PL ≥
qkPL( pkNB) + k(qkPL − qNB)
qNB
.
The retailer’s program when wholesale prices are set to marginal cost is thus:
max
( pk
NB
,qk
PL
)
Pk pkNB −
q2NB
2
( )
1 − p
k
NB − p˜PL
qNB − qkPL
( )
+ p˜PL −
(qkPL)2
2
( )
k − Fk
This leads to the following equilibrium under capacity constraint for the store
brand product:
pk
∗
NB =
1
4
qNB(2 + qNB); pk∗PL =
1
8
qNB(2 − 2k + qNB); qk∗PL =
qNB
2
.
Total quantities produced at the equilibrium are:
Dk
∗
PL = k and Dk
∗
NB =
1
4
qNB(2 − 2k + qNB).
The respective profits of the retailer and the manufacturer resulting from the
equilibrium are therefore:
pR(k∗) = (1 − a) qNB
16
(2kqNB + (qNB − 2)2 − 4k2)
and
pm(k∗) = a qNB
16
(2kqNB + (qNB − 2)2 − 4k2).
Figure 4 (computed with a = 1/4 and k = 0.235) depicts the equilibrium
product range. The manufacturer is capacity constrained when qNB ≥ 4k ¼
0.94 and the retailer withdraws the PL in the dashed area. Such values
where k is not too far from one-third cause the trade-off for the retailer to
occur making the branded manufacturer attractive enough for PL production.
Otherwise, when the constraint on k is too strong, then the price for the PL
would be too high in order to contain the demand.
Proposition 3. When the branded manufacturer is capacity constrained on PL
production only, he may still produce the PL for the retailer.
When capacity constraint applies only to PL production, the NB manufac-
turer is still selected for PL production (plain area nb2-k), even if the quan-
tities for PL goods are bound. However, if the cost-advantage of the
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branded manufacturer is small compared with an independent firm, the retailer
finds it more profitable to withdraw the PL from M and entrust his store brand
production to the competitive fringe (dashed area).
For a given NB quality, when maximal PL production is k, if the distributor
selects the branded manufacturer, then he chooses a higher PL quality com-
pared with (eq. cf2). It results in a higher PL quantity (set to k) as well as a
higher final PL price. The NB manufacturer has no other choice but to
adapt his production by reducing his NB quantity without changing its
price.14 One direct consequence is to reduce the revenues from the NB
while increasing those from the PL. The retailer may thus find it profitable
to entrust his PL to the NB manufacturer as long as his cost-advantage is
high enough to compensate for the rents on the PL he leaves to the manufac-
turer. Ultimately, the capacity constraint mainly hurts the NB manufacturer
while benefiting the retailer.
5. Incidences on quality and welfare
Once the retailer decides on the range of goods as well as his PL manufacturer,
one natural question is to ask about the optimal quality the NB manufacturer
may choose for his product. Indeed, the manufacturer may anticipate the retai-
ler’s decision (equilibrium) and adequately choose the quality of his NB given
the distributor’s strategy. Such a choice will therefore depend on the
Fig. 4. Equilibrium for retailer’s products (capacity constraint on PL only) when
a = 1/4 and k ¼ 0.235 (depicted zone restricted to qNB [ [3/4, 4/3] and c [ [1.3, 3]).
14 The property p(cf 2)NB = pnb2−kNB results from the additive form of the Mussa-Rosen utility combined
with the invariance property described in de Meza (1997).
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independent firm’s marginal cost (c), on the bargaining power (a) in the
vertical structure and on the capacity constraint scheme since these three
parameters are the determinants of the retailer’s decision. The resulting
profits for the NB manufacturer according to each possible outcome are the
following:
pM(nb1) = 2a
27
; pM(cf1) = 0; pM(nb2) = a
64
qNB(qNB(5qNB − 16) + 16)
pM(cf2) = aqNB(
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
(9c− 8)
√
(3cqNB((9c− 6)qNB − 8) + 16) +
NameMeNameMe
c
√ (3qNB(3c((10 − 9c)qNB + 8) − 32)16))
256
NameMeNameMe
c
√
and
pM(nb2−k) = a
16
qNB(−4k2 + 2kqNB + (qNB − 2)2).
The NB optimal quality is the one that maximises the manufacturer’s profits
as long as there is no constraint that makes the retailer altering his decision
about the product range or PL manufacturer. More precisely, the pattern
decision for the manufacturer can be summarised as follows: the optimal
(freely) chosen quality is interior to the relevant zone and then the NB
quality is set to this (optimal) level; otherwise, because of the assumption
on the concavity of profits, the chosen quality is the one belonging to the fron-
tier. For each case, Figure 5 depicts the optimal NB quality that could be
chosen by the NB manufacturer in each possible situation regarding the
capacity constraint and according to the cost of the rival-independent firm.
Proposition 4. The optimal NB quality chosen by the manufacturer,
according to PL characteristics, increases with the competitiveness of the
independent firm.
Proposition 4 is illustrated by Figure 5. First, for a low value of the
independent firm’s marginal cost, the manufacturer faces a trade-off
between the eq. cf1 and eq. cf2 outcomes. Since in eq. cf1, he does not
make any profits on the PL (produced by the competitive fringe), he
chooses qNB such that the retailer selects eq. cf2, that is for intermediate
values of NB quality. When c increases, being on the frontier, qNB decreases
because the retailer is more likely to sell the NB product (discriminating
demand in quality by selling both goods). However, NB quality may increase
as soon as the constraint is no longer binding for the manufacturer because it
increases NB sales while it decreases PL revenue and thus the retailer’s
outside option. Secondly, for intermediate values of c, the manufacturer’s
trade-off is degenerated between eq. cf2 and eq. nb1. Maximal profit (constant
in c) is obtained under eq. nb1 and there is therefore a range of low or high
optimal NB quality, depicted by the shaded areas in Figure 5. This situation
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occurs because in eq. cf2, the manufacturer sells only his NB leaving large
rents to the retailer due to the PL outside-option in the negotiation. Finally,
for higher values of c, the NB manufacturer will get the highest profits
when he produces both goods (eq. nb2). He therefore chooses the binding
NB quality such that the retailer does not entrust the PL to the independent
firm (unconstrained optimal quality for eq. nb2 region is q∗NB = 0.8 when
a = 1/4).
In the case where the NB manufacturer is capacity constrained on both
products, the same reasoning applies. However, one consequence is that the
NB quality is higher under capacity constraint (high values of c) because
the manufacturer has to prevent the retailer from entrusting his PL to the
independent firm (by choosing eq. cf2). This higher NB quality translates
into larger PL quantities (given the capacity constraint) in order to give
incentives to the retailer for entrusting the NB and PL to the NB manufacturer.
The same reasoning also applies to the last case where only the PL production
is capacity constrained. The NB manufacturer’s strategy is to give the retailer
Fig. 5. Optimal quality for the NB manufacturer in each possible equilibrium case.
Page 22 of 27 F. Berges and Z. Bouamra-Mechemache
 by guest on M
arch 24, 2011
e
ra
e
.o
xfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
adequate incentives to contract with him on both products in order to secure
PL production.
The retailer uses the PL as a countervailing tool in vertical negotiations with
the upstream manufacturer to get better tariff concessions. There may be
some negative effects for social welfare when he entrusts his own brand to
the competitive fringe since the independent firm is less efficient than the
NB manufacturer. Welfare and consumers’ surplus are compared in situations
where both products (NB and PL) are sold, that is, in cases (eq. cf2) and
(eq. nb2):
Wcf2
∗ = 3
256
qNB
(
qNB
(
9
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
9c− 8
√
c3/2qNB + 9(4 − 3c)cqNB
−8
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
9c− 8
√ NameMeNameMe
c
√
qNB − 32
)
+ 32
)
Wnb2
∗ = 3
128
qNB(qNB(5qNB − 16) + 16)
CScf2
∗ = 1
256
qNB
(
qNB
(
9
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
9c− 8
√
c3/2qNB + 9(4 − 3c)cqNB
−8
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
9c− 8
√ NameMeNameMe
c
√
qNB − 32
)
+ 32
)
CSnb2
∗ = 1
128
qNB(qNB(5qNB − 16) + 16).
In the specific case where c ¼ 1, the NB manufacturer has no efficiency
advantage and therefore, social welfare is the same under (eq. nb2) and
(eq. cf2). In other cases, we find that welfare is higher when the NB manufac-
turer produces the PL: Wnb2*.Wcf2* because the PL becomes more competi-
tive and increases PL consumers’ welfare.15 However, NB quantities sold are
lower in (eq. nb2) than in (eq. cf2) and consequently NB consumers’ surplus is
reduced. Ultimately, the PL effect overrides the NB effect and total consu-
mers’ surplus is higher in (eq. nb2): CSnb2*. CSnf2*. From the NB
manufacturer’s point of view, as previously seen, (eq. nb2) is always
preferred to (eq. cf2). The competitive fringe does not modify total
welfare because marginal cost pricing necessarily induces zero profit and
bargaining power between the retailer and the NB manufacturer does not
affect welfare either, since it only changes vertical surplus sharing. The
result is that social welfare is higher in (eq. nb2).
Social welfare may thus be harmed by the opportunistic behaviour of the
retailer when the PL becomes a bargaining chip for the NB negotiation with
the manufacturer.
15 Note that with the Mussa and Rosen demand function, consumers’ welfare depends not only
on total quantity of each product sold (given by the inverse quality-price ratio) but also on the
quality level of each product. Since the PL is of higher quality in (nb2) than in (eq. cf2), even if
sold at higher price, PL quantity increases (as well as PL consumers’ surplus) because of the
distribution of consumers’ valuation for quality.
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6. Conclusion
PL production is a key issue for the upstream food industry in terms of pro-
spects. An NB manufacturer who competes for the production of a PL may
find it profitable to produce the PL rather than letting the PL be produced
by an independent firm. The decision of the retailer regarding the choice
between the two potential producers (the NB manufacturer and an indepen-
dent firm from the competitive fringe) is not straightforward and deserves
some economic analysis. When the NB manufacturer’s production capacity
is not limited, the retailer’s choice will mainly result from the trade-off
between production efficiency and profitability.
We show that introducing capacity constraints also matters. Assuming that
the NB manufacturer may not be able to produce the total quantity required by
the retailer when agreeing to manufacture the PL, we find that the retailer will
turn to the independent firm for the store brand rather than accepting the pro-
duction reorganisation proposed by the NB manufacturer. However, if the
capacity constraint applies only to the PL product due to the specificity of
the production process, the retailer may accept to entrust his own brand to
the NB manufacturer. Indeed, the PL then benefits from a higher quality
and a higher price in order to limit store brand quantities such that capacity
constraint is fulfilled. The conclusions of our article thus partially confirm
branded manufacturers’ thinking: they may produce store brands when they
are not capacity constrained on total production. However, once the pro-
duction process is specific to the product (translating into significant
switching-costs between production technologies), then the manufacturers’
thinking is partially true. The retailer may indeed entrust the PL to the NB
manufacturer even if capacity constrained, and the latter finds it is more profit-
able to produce the PL rather than letting another firm do so.
The results found in this article may shed some light on the potential
impacts on the agrofood sector. First, the quality of food products provided
on the market depends on two forces: bargaining power of the retail industry
and production reorganisation by manufacturers due to capacity constraints.
Indeed, when the retail industry becomes more concentrated (which is the
observed trend in the European retailing sector), we can reasonably suppose
that retailers’ bargaining power increases. According to our results, this
could lead branded manufacturers to produce PL at a lower cost than indepen-
dent firms, increasing the average quality of food commodities. Moreover, an
increase in independent firms’ competitiveness may push the NB manufac-
turer to increase its NB quality in order to keep PL production, eventually
resulting in higher quality for both products.
Secondly, our model gives some insights into the production structure of the
agrofood industry. For categories of products where branded manufacturers
have a strong image (must-stock items for instance), PL are more likely to
be produced by a set of independent firms specialised in store brand pro-
duction. However, if NB competition increases on shelves, this may lower
brand manufacturers’ position relative to retailers, jeopardising their initial
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decision about no PL production. Additionally, PL production by branded
manufacturer seems to depend on how total production is organised within
the factories. A brand manufacturer dividing its total production between
different plants may indeed have an incentive to leave the PL production
exclusively to some units (up to their capacity). Conversely, a manufacturer
operating its total production in one single factory may find it difficult to
change the production mix between PL and NB, resulting in no PL
production at all.
Finally, our findings also tackle the product diversity issue: when the NB
quality relative to PL is quite high (or too low), the retailer may find it profit-
able to delist the NB, thereby reducing product diversity for consumers. Such
a decision clearly impacts social welfare in the sense that PL introduction may
lead to NB eviction, reversing the classic conclusions about welfare improve-
ment after PL commercialisation. In addition to this effect, the opportunistic
retailer’s decision on PL production (biased through market power or capacity
constraint issues) may not coincide with the optimal outcome where the NB
manufacturer should be selected (lower production cost).
A limitation of our model is that it does not take into account the upstream
competition between different NBs. Increasing the number of branded manu-
facturers would probably generate a decrease in NB prices, making the PL less
attractive (because of its lower quality), resulting in a less valuable
outside-option for the retailer. This may less likely lead to equilibria where
the PL is produced by an independent firm. Besides, increased upstream
competition could force the branded manufacturer to produce the PL as a
counter-strategy, and ask the retailer to remove rival brands from the
shelves as compensation in the negotiation. First, it should be noted that
such an ‘agreement’ is illicit from a competition policy point of view. Fore-
closing rival brands would indeed result in lower variety offered to consumers
without any efficiency increase in the vertical relationship. Secondly, the
retailer may be reluctant to accept such a hazardous deal since there is a trade-
off between a PL produced at a lower cost (in our framework) and a decrease
in intrabrand competition in store (not modelled). In the long run, the draw-
back of such a strategy may override the efficient PL production gains.
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